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STATEMENT
The respondents, Yirginia Latsis Zambukos and
Utah Savings & Trust Company, both contend in their
briefs that the appointment of an attorney for absentee
heirs and minors under Section 75-14-25, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, vests such an attorney with full power
not only to represent such heirs at all proceedings after
his appointment, including confirmations of sales, settlements, partitions and distributions of estates, but gives
him the right of compromise and adjustment. In fact,
they claim that he is practically an attorney in fact.
They seem to lay considerable stress upon the words
"settlements" and "distributions."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
MEANING OF THE WORD "SETTLEMENT".

POINT 2.
LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY OF AN ATTORNEY
APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 75-14-25, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.

POINT 3.
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF OCTOBER 9, 1945, IN
ITS PRESENT FORM, IS VOID.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
MEANING OF THE WORD "SETTLEMENT".

The word "settlement" does not include a compromise. "Settlernent", as used in this statute, means as
follows:
Joyner et u.r. r. City of Seattle, (\Vash.) 258 Pac.

479:
"Compromise is the purchase of peace ( 12 C.
•J. 315) ; and, as a corollary, settlement is the
consummation thereof."
Black's Lw1-· Dictionary, Third Edition, at page 161:~,

defines the word ":.;et tlement" in connection with pro hate
practice as follows:
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"The settlement of an estate consists in its
administration bv the executor or administrator
carried so far tha·t all debts and legacies have been
paid and the individual shares of distributees in
the corpus of the estate, or the residuary portion,
as the case Inay he, definitely ascertained and
deterniined, and accounts filed and passed, so
that nothing remains but to make final distribution. ~ee Calkins v. ~mith, -+1 :Jlich. 409, 1 N. W.
10-18: Forbes Y. Harrington, 171 ~Ia~~. 386, 50 N.
E. 6-!1: ~-\ppeal of .Jiathe"·~, 7:2 Conn. 555, 45 A.
170; Pearce Y. Pearce, 199 Ala. -191, 74 So. 952,
957."
TVords a.nd Phra.ses, Pennanent Edition, Volun1e 39,
page 67, in discussing the word "settlen1ent'' in connection with an estate, sets forth as follows:
"'Ordinarily, 'settlen1ent of an estate' Ineans
payment of taxes and debts and distribution of
estate among those entitled thereto. In re
\Yraught's Estate, 32 A. 2d 8, 9, 347 Pa. 165. * * *
The 'settle1nent of an estate' is the process by
which letters testamentary or of administration
are granted, assets collected, claims allowed, debts
paid, real estate sold if necessary for the payment
of debts, and the property distributed to those
who are entitled to it by the laws of descent or by
the will. In re Bishop's Estate, 18 N. E. 2d 218,
219, 370 Ill. 173."
POINT 2.
LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY OF AN ATTORNEY
APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 75'-14-25, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.
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It is contended by respondents that we do not
question the constitutionality of the statute or the
appointment of Mr. CotroManes thereunder. It is true
that we do not question 1ihe constitutionality of the
statute nor the authority of the court to appoint l\Ir.
Cotro-Manes under the statute. However, we do question
the extent of his authority and power under such an
appointment.
Our statute was adopted in 1898 and known as
Section 4050 of the Revised Statutes of rtah of 1898. It
was taken from the California Code of Ciril Procedurr,
Section 1718, which statute is as follows:
"Sec. 1718. At or before the hearing of petitions and contests for the probate of wills, for
letters testamentary or of administration; for
sales of real estate, and confirmations thereof,
settlements, partitions, and distribution of estatr~
setting apart homesteads, and all other proceedings where all the parties interested in the estate
are required to be notified thereof - the court
may, in its discretion, appoint some competent
attorney at law to represent in all such proceedings the devisees, legatees, heirs, or creditors of
the decedent who are minors and have no general
guardian in the county, or who are non-residents
of the state; and those interested who, though
they are neither such minors or nonresidents, are
unrepresented. The order must specif~· the names
of the parties so far as known for whom the attorney is appointed, who is thereh~· authorized to
represent such parties in all such proceedings had
subsequent to his appointment. The attorney ma~·
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receiYe a fee, to be fixed by the court, for his
seiTices, which must be paid out of the funds of
the estate as necessary expenses of administration, and upon distribution may be charged to the
party represented by the attorney. If, for any
cause, it becomes necessary, the court may substitute another attorney for the one first appointed, in which case the fee must be proportionately divided. The non-appointment of an
attorney will not affect the validity of any of the
proceedings."
At the time it was adopted from California, there weretwo California court decisions construing this statute.
One was the case of the Estate of James Devoe, Deceased,
::M~yrick's Probate Reports, page 6.
This case was
decided in San Francisco in 1872. The deceased died
and left his widow, an adult son and a minor 'SOn surviving him. The adult son was named executor under the
will. At the time the petition for probate of the will was
heard, the court appointed an attorney to represent the
minor. A contest of the will was filed by the widow and
the minor. Later the contest was withdrawn and the
will was admitted to probate upon the stipulation of the
widow and the attorney appointed to represent the
minor. A year later a general guardian wa:s appointed
for the minor and he filed a contest of the will. The
executor objected and the court held:
"Held, an attorney appointed by the court
cannot waive any right of his ward: the, infant
was not bound by the acts of the attorney. Objection overruled."
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(The above volun1e is not available at the State
Capital but may be found at the University of rtah Law
Library.)
The other case, decided in 1892, was the Estate of
William P. Fuller, Deceased, 2 Coffey's Probate Decisions 521:
"Mr. Lyons was appointed by an order of
this court, dated June 13, 1890, to represent certain minor heirs of decedent in proceedings in
probate of will and administration of estate in
this department. * * *
Mr. Lyons was not, and could not have been,
appointed to represent the estate. The attorney
for the executrix was employed and is allowed
cmnpensation to manage the legal affairs of the
estate. He is accountable for the proper performance of his duties as such attorney. He prepares
all the papers, appears as the principal representative in the court, is looked to h)' the court
as responsible for the conduct of the legal affair~,
while the appointed attorney is an auxiliary of the
court, and his service is, in a sense, subordinate.
He acts as a scrutineer of the affairs of admini~
tration, a challenger and critic of the management
of the estate, and is expected to advise the court,
from time to time, as to any default or dereliction
on the part of the administrator or executor."
Since the adoption of the California statute h)' Ftali,
the following interpretations haYe been placed upon the
California statute:
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11 Cal. Ju.r., Section 793, Page 120-l:

.. Sec. 793. In General. - A statute, in force
for Inany years, but now repealed, provided that
at or before the hearing of petitions and contests
for probate of wills, for letters, for sales of real
estate and confirmations, settlemenh;, partitions
and distributions of estates, setting apart hOinesteads, and all other proceedin~s where all parties
interested in the estate were required to be notified, the court n1ight in its discretion appoint
son1e competent attorney to represent the
deYisees, legatees, heirs or creditors of the decedent, who were minors and had no general guardian in the county or who ''Tere nonresidents of the
state, as well as those who, though neither minors
or nonresidents, were unrepresented. It was
further provided, however, that the nonappointment of an attorney would not affect the validity
of any of the proceedings. It was solely for the
probate court to determine whether to appoint
such attorney, and the appointment was in its
discretion. The rule was, however, that the court
would not make an appointment except in case~
where manifestly necessary, and in no case upon
the suggestion of the executor or administrator
or other person in adverse interest. Such a.ttorney
acted only as a scrutineer of the affa,irs of
administration, to advise the court of any default
or dereliction on the part of the e.recutor or
administrator. He could not institute proceedings,
but could only be appointed after some other
person had instituted proceedings of which the
court had jurisdiction of the heirs, and he could
not invest the court with jurisdiction of the person of the minor heirs which it had not already
acquired, nor 1raire any riqht of tlle heir. Such an
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at~orney could not be appointed for an absent
heu already represented by an attorney, and as
soon as the absent heir was represented hy an
attorney employed by himself the functions of the
appointee ceased. Absent heirs who were sui
juris were entitled to a substitution of an attorney of their own selection. While the section was
in force, there was no need for the appointment
of a guardian ad litem for a minor heir. And
since the repeal of the statute, the court has no
power to appoint an attorney to represent minor
heirs as such, and seems to be limited to the
general laws of guardianship.

It is still provided as to proceedings to deterInine heirship that the court may appoint an
attorney for any minor mentioned in said proceedings not having a guardian." (Italics ours).

In re Lux's Estate, (Cal.) 66 Pac. 30. The court, in
discussing Section 1718 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
states as follows:
"The statute is a very extraordinary one, but
some of its provisions have been in force since
1851, without any serious challenge of its validity.
The court can no more appoint an attorney trith
authority to bind a person u:lw is sui .furis, to
waive his rights, or concede claims ma.de against
him, or to institute proceedings for 71 im, and
incur costs chargeable to him, than it ran do all
these things without an attorney. And thi~, I
think, indicates the functions of an attorney so
appointed. The court can do nothing with the
aid of the attorney which it could not have done
without him. He receives his authority only from
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the court, and not at all from the absent heir. As
friend of the court, his function simply is to aid
the court i.n conserring the rights of ~tnreprc
sented parties. In all the proceedings specified
there n1ight be a reason for securing such aid.
\Vitnesses 1night be examined; and although, as
a rule, whenever there was reason for a controversy, son1e heir would be on hand to perform the
duty, still, on rare occasions, the contrary might
be the case. On anY other view as to the nature
of the duties of such attorney, the validity of the
statute could only be sustained on the theory
that succession being a matter of legislative control, the legislature has the power to authorize
a probate judge to give some portion of each
estate to such attorneys as he should designate.
\Y e are not at liberty to attribute such motive to
the legislators; nor was it, I am convinced, so in
fact. The appointment is authorized only for a
devisee, legatee, heir, or creditor. Before the
appointment can be made, the court must be
satisfied that such persons exist, and the order
1nust designate who they are, or otherwise the
fee allowed cannot be charged to the person represented by the attorney. If their names are not
known, they must still be identified in some mode
in the order. It is evident that an attorney cannot be appointed for an absent heir who is already
represented by an attorney. A provision for the
appointment of an attorney in such a case would
serve no useful purpose, and it would add greatly
to the objections to the statute, to suppose that
it was intended to forbid a party the right to be
represented by his own attorney, a,nd compel him.
to accept and be bowrul by the acts of an attorney
appointed without his consent. And it follows
that, as soon as the absent heir is represented
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by an attorney employed by himself, the functions
of the appointee cease. These last consequences
would follow though the validity of the statute
were conceded to the fullest extent." (Italics
ours).
The Supreme Court of South Dakota in the case of

In re Otting's Estate, (S. D.) 252 N. W. 740, approves
the same limitation placed on a similar statute as was
construed in the Lux case. The court states:
"The justification for the appointment of an
attorney under section 3195 and his function when
appointed we believe to be rightly stated in the
Lux case when the court :said: 'The court can no
more appoint an attorney with authority to bind
a person who is sui juris, to waive his rights, or
concede claims made against him, or to institute
proceedings for him, and incur costs chargeable
to him, than it can do all these things without an
attorney. And this, I think, indicates the functions
of an attorney so appointed. The court can do
nothing with the aid of the attorney which it
could not have done without him. He receives his
authority only from the court, and not at all from
the absent heir. As friend of the court, his function simply is to aid the court in conserving the
rights of unrepresented parties."
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that an
attorney appointed under our statute has merely limited
power, and that is to protect the rights of heirs and
minors, and does not have the general power to compromise or waive any of their rights or claims.
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POINT 3.
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF OCTOBER 9, 1945, IN
ITS PRESENT FORl\I, IS VOID.
~-ls the above authorities indicate, the court cannot
do with an attorney what it could have done without having appointed an attorney, and there can be no question
that the court would not have ordered distribution in the
manner it has in this estate unless the heirs had consented and acquiesced thereto. The court would have
required the estate to be distributed in accordance with
our laws of succession. In fact, it would not have had the
power to do otherwise. The court was without judicial
power to render the particular judgment or decree. The
decree of distribution of October 9, 1945, in its present
form, is void. Winona Oil Co. v. Barnes, (Okl.) 200 Pac.
981:

.. In the body of the opinion the court, using
part of its own language and quoting from Bailey
on Jurisdiction, stated as follows:
'A court must proceed and determine within
the limits of the power conferred. If it renders a
judgment in an action or proceeding, where jurisdiction has attached, that it was not authorized
or empowered to render at all, such judgment or
decree is in excess of its jurisdiction, and for that
reason a nullity. So, if it render a judgment or
decree which is within its authority as to part
only, but includes also that which is not within
its power, the excess will be a nullity, and if the
valid and invalid parts are independent of each
other, the whole will not be void, but only such
part as is in excess of the powers of the court.'
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Let us apply the sa1ne principle to the case
at bar. Conceding the petition sufficient, the
court had authority to order a sale of the oil and
gas lease to the highest and best bidder. The
court did not order the sale of an oil and gas lease
to the highest and best bidder, but ordered it
sold to the Winona Oil Company. This order
was void, and the proceedings had in carrying
into effect said order was likewise void, for want
of authority in the court to make the order.
A judgment is void when it affirmatively
appears from an inspection of the judgment roll
that any one of three following jurisdictional elements are absent: First, jurisdidion over the
person; second, jurisdiction of the subject-matter;
and, third, judicial power to render the particular
judgment. Oklahoma City v. Corporation Commission, 195 Pac. 498; Roth v. Union National
Bank, supra.
In the case of Pettis v. Johnston, 190 Pac.
681, this court, in passing upon the effect of a
judgment void upon its face, stated as follows:
'A judgment which is void upon its face, and
requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to
demonstrate its want of validity, is a 'dead limb
upon the judicial tree, which may be chopped off
at any time'; it can bear no fruit to the plaintiff,
but is a constant menace to the defendant, and
may be vacated by the court rendered it 'at any
time on motion of a party or an~' person affected
thereby,' either before or after the expiration of
three years from the rendition of such void judgInent. Such 1notion is unhampered h~· a limitation
of time.'"
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Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Yolume 1,

Section 825, Page 650:
"'Broadly speaking, nullity of judgments
results from one or more of the following eau~es:
1. \Y ant of a legally organized rourt or tribunal;
2. \Yant of requisite jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the parties or both: 3. \Yant of power
to grant the relief contained in the judgment."
Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Volume 1,

Section 35-1, Page 733:
''It is very easy to conceive of judgments
which, though entered in cases over which the
court had undoubted jurisdiction, are void because
they decided some questions which it had no
power to decide, or granted some relief which it
had no power to grant, and yet it will probably
not be possible to formulate any test by which to
unerringly determine whether the action of the
court is in similar cases void, or erroneous only.
'It is well settled by the authorities that a judgment nmy be void for want of authority in a
court to render the particular judgment rendered
though the court may have had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties.' But under
such circumstances the court should not be held
to have lost jurisdiction unless it clearly appears
that it entered a decree not authorized under the
facts or not warranted by law. Nevertheless in
the actual rendition of the judgment, the court
1nust remain within its jurisdiction and powers.
For it is the power or authority behind a judg~
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ment, rather than the mere result reached, which
determines its validity and immunity from collateral attack. A wrong decision made within the
limits of the court's authority is error correctable
on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or
for that matter a correct, decision where the court
in rendering it oversteps its jurisdiction and
power is void and may be set aside either direct]~·
or collaterally. Such excess of authorit~· or power
is akin to a want of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the nature and requisites of which are
treated in earlier sections of this chapter."
As indicated by the above authorities, the mere appointment of Mr. Cotro-Manes under Section 7:'5-14-:!:'5, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, did not improve the E:ituation or
make the manner of distribution legal.
The contention made by respondent Yirginia LatE:is
Zambukos that distribution might have been held up
indefinitely is not true. This estate could have been
handled in one of two ways. They could have gotten thr
consent and ratification of the heirs, which

wa~

contem-

plated by the stipulation entered into, or they could have
distributed the estate in accordance with the provisions
of our laws of succession. As to making actual transfer
or delivery of funds or property to the absent heirs,
there are ample provisions in our :-;tatute for

~ueh,

but

this question is not here involved.
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CONCLUSION
\Ye respectfully submit that the petitions of the
heirs should not have been dismissed and that further
administration of this estate, including an order for
final distribution in accordance with the laws of succession, should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,

\VHITE, WRIGHT& ARNOVITZ,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
~IATTSSON,

JAl\IES W. BELESS, JR.,
Attorneys for Petitioners and
Appellants
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